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Chester Arthur’s Ghost:
A Cautionary Tale of Campaign
Finance Reform
by Anthony J. Gaughan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Chester Arthur may not be the first name that comes to mind when
one thinks of major figures in the rise of campaign finance law. But
despite his obscurity, he deserves to be ranked among the leading
reformers in American history. As President, he signed into law a
reform that cleared the way for the modern system of campaign finance
to take root.
This Article puts the current debate over money in politics in
historical context by examining the first major campaign finance reform
in American history. The 1883 Pendleton Act 1 is remembered today for
establishing a professional, nonpartisan civil service. But equally
important, it banned the use of political assessments (that is,
mandatory dues imposed on federal and state officeholders by the
political parties) to fund federal election campaigns.2
President Arthur played an important role in the Pendleton Act’s
success. After signing the bill into law, he supported efforts to enforce
the new rules and reform the major parties’ campaign finance practices.
In the long run, Arthur and the reformers achieved their goal of ending
the parties’ use of political assessments to fund campaigns. At the same
time, however, the Pendleton Act shifted election financing from the
*Professor of Law and Kern Family Chair in Law, Drake University Law School.
University of Minnesota (B.A., 1993); Louisiana State University (M.A., 1996); University
of Wisconsin-Madison (Ph.D. (History) 2002); Harvard Law School (J.D., 2005). For their
assistance with this Article and the paper upon which it is based, I would like to thank
Rebecca Lutkenhaus, Gary Simson, Lori Ringhand, Benjamin Cover, Jacob Eisler,
Michael Dimino, Atiba Ellis, Maia Middleton, Samuel Lyon, and the staff of the Mercer
Law Review. All errors of fact or interpretation that remain are my responsibility alone.
1. Pendleton Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
2. The material in this paragraph is discussed in detail in Part II below.
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political parties to corporate America and wealthy donors. Thus,
instead of reducing the influence of money in politics, the Pendleton Act
ushered in a new and even more controversial era in campaign finance
law, one that continues to haunt our politics today. 3
The story of the Pendleton Act is thus of much more than just
historical interest. It demonstrates how deeply rooted the problem of
money in politics is in American history. Long before the Supreme
Court of the United States heard cases like Buckley v. Valeo4 and
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,5 money played a highly
controversial role in American elections. As the story of the Pendleton
Act demonstrates, campaign finance reforms have had unintended—
and sometimes quite unwelcome—consequences from the very
beginning.
II. THE AGE OF POLITICAL ASSESSMENTS
In the first decades of the American republic, presidents usually left
in place a large number of their predecessors’ subcabinet appointments,
regardless of the employee’s political affiliation. 6 For example, even
after the acrimonious 1800 election, Thomas Jefferson kept nearly half
the executive branch officials appointed by his bitter rival and
predecessor, John Adams.7 But a far more partisan approach to
government staffing would take hold as the size of the federal
bureaucracy grew.8 By the 1820s, the federal government’s major
departments—particularly the United States Post Office, the Treasury
Department, and the War Department—employed thousands, which

3. The material in this paragraph is discussed in detail in Part III and Part IV
below.
4. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
5. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
6. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY,
1829–1861, 300 (1954).
7. MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE STATE: THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
EXPERIENCE 65 (1994) (“During his first two years in office, Jefferson replaced somewhat
over half the officials appointed by his predecessors—186 of 316 presidential appointees—
and then he stopped.”).
8. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928,
41 (2001) (“[T]he signal institutional development in the Jeffersonian period of American
history (1801–29) was the explosion of a structurally static executive bureaucracy”);
SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 66–67.
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created an opportunity for the major parties to turn government
payrolls into a source of campaign funds. 9
The new approach to government employees began with the
presidency of Andrew Jackson, a fiercely partisan Democrat.10 When
Jackson took office in 1829, he used the growing federal bureaucracy to
advance his party’s hold on the government. 11 President Jackson and
his fellow Democrats built highly professional political machines in
states across the country (the direct antecedents of modern campaign
organizations) that were specifically designed to establish a national
political party and raise money from a large number of politically
interested donors.12 In the process, the Jacksonian Democrats brought
thousands of people from working class and middle-class backgrounds
into government positions previously monopolized by upper-class
elites.13
Under Jackson’s “patronage” system (also known as the “rotation” or
“spoils” system), the Democratic Party fired nearly all preexisting
government employees—low and high ranking alike—and replaced
them with loyal Democrats.14 Although Jackson and the Democrats
initiated the system in 1829, the Whig Party followed suit when it won

9. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS, supra note 6, at 308
(noting that the federal government employed 10,093 officeholders in 1830).
10. See ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON 108–111, 124–26 (1999).
11. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND
MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1992).
12. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41 (Jackson’s patronage system was “designed to
distribute the offices of state to party loyalists and to extract from those loyalists the votes
and funds necessary to compete for electoral supremacy.”).
13. SKOCPOL, supra note 11, at 96 (“Patronage democracy in nineteenth-century
America did indeed sponsor a sort of distributive, discretionary welfare regime . . . . The
urban machines were the parts of the party system most directly in touch with the new
industrial working class.”), 98 (“Jobs . . . were the most important kind of aid that
machine politicians provided members of the urban working class”); SHEFTER, supra
note 7, at 68 (“By removing the bureaucrats appointed by their predecessors, the
Jacksonians sought to sever the ties between the bureaucracy and these traditional social
structures . . . .”), 71 (“In sum, the electoral and administrative reforms of the
Jacksonians emerged out of the efforts of a middle-class leadership group to overturn a
previously dominant class of notables by pursuing a strategy of mass mobilization.”).
14. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41 (describing the patronage, or spoils, system
whereby “[a]t every change in presidential administration, much of the federal
bureaucracy would flush itself out through the rotation of party members in and out of
executive departments.”); SKOCPOL, supra note 11, at 83 (“the Jacksonians consolidated
and celebrated partisan party control over the ‘spoils of office,’ which meant in effect that
the party organizations colonized nineteenth-century U.S. public administration.”).
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the White House in 1840. 15 Presidents soon understood that their own
political fortunes depended on their commitment to the patronage
system. In 1847, President James Polk wrote in his diary that “[t]he
office seekers have become so numerous that they hold the balance of
power between the two great parties of the country.” 16 By the time
James Buchanan took office in 1857, the spoils system was an
entrenched feature of American government. 17 As the political scientist
Daniel Carpenter has observed, the patronage system defined
nineteenth century “party politics more than any other development,
save perhaps the Civil War.”18
The parties’ interest in building highly cohesive organizations
stemmed from the inescapable reality that the nation’s growth gave rise
to steadily increasing campaign costs. In 1860, for example, the United
States had a population of 30 million, and the Republican National
Committee (RNC) spent $100,000 to secure Abraham Lincoln’s election
to the presidency.19 By 1884, the nation’s population exceeded 50
million, and the RNC spent more than $400,000 (the equivalent of $10
million in today’s dollars) in the presidential campaign that year. 20
The patronage system played a crucial role in financing the
increasingly costly federal and state election campaigns. 21 In the 1830s,
the parties began to require government employees to contribute a
percentage of their salaries to the party in power for use in its
reelection campaign.22 Government employees who refused risked
losing their jobs.23 These mandatory dues became known as political or

15. WHITE, supra note 6, at 313 (“Both Whig and Democratic administrations followed
the practice of Jackson”).
16. Id. at 305.
17. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; WHITE, supra note 6, at 313 (“The full application
of the theory of rotation came with Buchanan”).
18. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41.
19. LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 71 (1932).
20. MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION: THE MAKING OF A
PRESIDENT 1884, 168 (2000). See also OVERACKER, supra note 19, at 71.
21. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41.
22. MARK WAHLGREN SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES: GETTING, KEEPING, AND USING
POWER IN GILDED AGE POLITICS 149 (2004) (“In return for being rewarded an office, the
loyal partisan was expected to pay some of his or her salary to campaign funds”);
CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41 (“Officeholders were required by the major parties to
contribute a substantial percentage of their annual salaries—usually several hundred
dollars or more per person at a time when most federal employees made less than $1,000
annually—to the party coffers.”); DOROTHY GANFIELD FOWLER, THE CABINET POLITICIAN:
THE POSTMASTERS GENERAL 1829–1909, 34 (1967) (“The rate varied from 1 to 6 percent.”).
23. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 149
(“On the whole, those who refused one assessment were well advised to submit to others,
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party “assessments,” and the parties imposed them on every federal,
state, county, and municipal employee.24 The system reached full
maturity under President Martin Van Buren, the Democrat who
succeeded Jackson in the White House in 1837. 25 One newspaper of the
era reported that, under Van Buren, “every officeholder . . . was subject
to a tax for election purposes.”26
The career prospects of individual party officials depended on their
success in raising money for the party.27 Senior government officials
understood that their professional future depended on generous
contributions to their party. For example, New York City Postmaster
Isaac Fowler gave $1,000—a huge sum at the time—to James
Buchanan’s presidential campaign in 1856. 28 The parties also
demanded that candidates themselves make and solicit large campaign
contributions.29 By the 1880s, for example, the parties expected each
New York City mayoral candidate to come up with $25,000 for
campaign expenses.30 Political assessments thus served as a crucial
source of campaign funds.31 As the historian Mark Wahlgren Summers
has observed, “[t]he assessment process, both on candidates and on
officeholders, was in effect an informal tax system to sustain the
parties.”32
From the beginning, critics warned that the patronage system
resulted in government officeholders motivated by personal profit
and those who had given in the past were best protected for exercising their discretion
thereafter.”); FOWLER, supra note 22, at 34 (“when an employee protested, he was usually
asked if his fifteen hundred dollar job was not worth fifteen dollars.”), 99 (“It was tacitly
understood, however, that if a clerk refused to pay the percentage set, he might lose his
job”).
24. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; WHITE, supra note 6, at 332; SUMMERS, PARTY
GAMES, supra note 22, at 149 (“National, state, county, ward, and district organizations
sent out requests [for assessments] . . . . No salary was too modest to be overlooked, from
municipal scrubwomen to disabled inmates of soldiers’ homes and jailhouse wardens.”).
25. FOWLER, supra note 22, at 34.
26. Id.
27. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41.
28. FOWLER, supra note 22, at 99.
29. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 150 (Campaign donations “were
expected, even demanded, of any nominee.”).
30. Id.
31. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, 53 (1982); CARPENTER, supra note 8,
at 41 (“Party assessments were the institutional glue that bound party to state in the
nineteenth century”); SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 149 (“At the heart of
party finance was the principle of assessment on officeholders in particular and partisans
in general.”).
32. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 154.
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rather than political principles. Former President John Quincy Adams,
for example, described the new political class as “wolves of the
antechamber, prowling for offices.”33 But Jacksonian democracy had
some redeeming qualities as well. By creating modern political parties
and tying their electoral success to job security for government
employees, the spoils system encouraged mass participation in
democratic elections.34 The patronage system took root at a time when
states across the country adopted universal white male suffrage, a
development that dramatically increased the size of the electorate. 35
With the parties mobilizing voters on a massive scale, turnout among
eligible voters stood at 75% from the 1840s until 1900, the highest
turnout level in American history. 36 Thus, under the spoils system, the
United States became the “world’s first large-scale popular
democracy.”37 As one observer remarked in the 1840s, the country
“heaved and tossed in wild commotion at every presidential election as
a result of the hope of office.”38
Not coincidentally, the surge in turnout levels saw money flow into
campaigns like never before. As election costs soared, the assessment
system gave the parties a ready source of campaign funds, which not all
politicians viewed as a good thing. In 1834, Senator Daniel Webster
condemned political assessments as “abuse of official station” and
“misuse of the money paid for public services.” 39 But the lucrative
assessment system proved irresistible to the parties. With each passing
decade, the parties became ever more proficient at wringing funds out
of government employees. In 1853, for example, political assessments
on the 557 employees of the Port of New York generated $6,817.50 per
month for the Democratic Party.40 The growing number of local, state,
and federal government employees generated a steady flow of campaign

33. WHITE, supra note 6, at 303.
34. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 42 (“[T]he spoils system invigorated American
democracy by creating the world’s first nationwide mass parties.”).
35. SKOCPOL, supra note 11, at 72 (1992) (“The franchise was extended to virtually all
adult white males” by the 1840s.); WHITE, supra note 6, at 333 (“Large masses of new
voters were enrolled as old suffrage limitations were abandoned.”).
36. SKOCPOL, supra note 11, at 76 (“It was also the most democratically mobilized in
American history, since turnout rates in U.S. national elections from the 1840s to the
turn of the century consistently remained much higher than either previously or
afterward.”); RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 200–201 (1986).
37. SKOCPOL, supra note 11, at 72.
38. WHITE, supra note 6, at 325.
39. Id. at 334.
40. Id. at 335.
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cash for the parties. By 1881, for example, the Postal Service alone
employed 55,000 people, which made it a major source of funds for the
incumbent Republican Party.41
President Lincoln was one of the most aggressive and successful
practitioners of the dark arts of patronage and fundraising. 42 Upon
taking office he removed 1,457 of 1,639 officials. 43 During the Civil War,
the Lincoln Administration imposed steep political assessments on
Republican officeholders, usually five percent of their salaries but in
some case up to ten percent.44 Lincoln required campaign contributions
from Republican-appointed customs officers, federal workers, war
contractors, and even Cabinet officials. 45 Three of Lincoln’s cabinet
members—William Seward, John Palmer Usher, and Montgomery
Blair—contributed $500 each to the reelection campaign, and the
campaign assessed $250 campaign dues on the rest of the Cabinet
members.46 Meanwhile, Henry Raymond, Lincoln’s campaign manager,
collected assessment dues even from low-ranking employees engaged in
menial tasks.47 Those who refused to pay were removed from office.48
Not everyone was happy to pay.49 Gideon Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary
of the Navy, privately complained that the political assessments were
“not in all respects right or proper.”50 In his diary, Welles bitterly
criticized Lincoln’s campaign manager, who Welles believed lacked
“honesty” and “principle” and employed instead “[m]oney” and the
promise of government offices to win elections. 51 But Lincoln himself
was unapologetic and sternly summoned Secretary Welles to the White
House for a meeting with Raymond.52 As the historian David Herbert
41. ZACHARY KARABELL, CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 96 (2004).
42. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN RECONSIDERED: ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR
ERA 173-79 (3d ed. 2001); CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE
169–72 (1905); JOHN G. SPROAT, “THE BEST MEN”: LIBERAL REFORMERS IN THE GILDED
AGE 258 (1968) (“Lincoln, of course, had made brilliant use of the patronage in the
campaign and election of 1864.”).
43. FISH, supra note 42, at 170.
44. JOHN C. WAUGH, REELECTING LINCOLN: THE BATTLE FOR THE 1864 PRESIDENCY
314, 329–30 (1997); DONALD, supra note 42, at 178–79; FRANCIS BROWN, RAYMOND OF THE
TIMES 262–64 (1951).
45. WAUGH, supra note 44, at 329–31; DONALD, supra note 42, at 178–79; BROWN,
supra note 44, at 262–64.
46. CHARLES BRACELEN FLOOD, 1864: LINCOLN AT THE GATES OF HISTORY 314 (2009).
47. Id. at 314, 316.
48. MALCOLM MOOS, THE REPUBLICANS: A HISTORY OF THEIR PARTY 115 (1956).
49. BROWN, supra note 44, at 262–63.
50. WAUGH, supra note 44, at 330.
51. Id. at 330–31.
52. DONALD, supra note 42, at 179.
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Donald has explained, the president’s campaign manager “gave the
Secretary a little lecture on the political facts of life, with Lincoln
silently approving each word.”53
Lincoln acknowledged that he engaged in patronage tactics as
aggressively “as any administration ever did.”54 Political realities
demanded nothing less in the president’s view. The funds the
administration raised from government employees enabled Lincoln to
distribute seven million campaign pamphlets, a vast circulation that far
surpassed the efforts of his Democratic opponent, George McClellan.55
In addition, Raymond sent thousands of dollars to Republican
organizations in key states, such as Pennsylvania and Indiana, and he
funded campaign speakers in cities and towns across the North. 56
Lincoln’s successful 1864 reelection campaign also broke new
fundraising ground. Not content to rely on officeholder assessments, the
Lincoln campaign received large contributions from business and
industry.57 For example, the head of the Phelps, Dodge & Co. mining
and metal manufacturing company in New York contributed $3,000 to
the Republican election campaign. 58 To be sure, political assessments
remained the backbone of Lincoln’s 1864 reelection strategy, but the
incipient ties between business interests and the Lincoln campaign
anticipated subsequent campaign finance developments. The Pendleton
Act in the 1880s would accelerate the marriage of business and politics
and set the stage for the modern era of campaign finance law.
III. THE PENDLETON ACT
In the years after the Civil War, the assessment system came under
increasing public criticism.59 Newspapers and magazines like the
Nation played a key role in bringing attention to the influence of money
in politics, describing it as a source of corruption and a threat to good
government.60 Although the funding practices of the 1870s and early
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 177.
MOOS, supra note 48, at 115.
BROWN, supra note 44, at 264.
FLOOD, supra note 46, at 318.
BROWN, supra note 44, at 263; FLOOD, supra note 46, at 318.
ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM MOVEMENT, 1865–1883, 13, 14–15 (1968)(describing the civil service reform bill
authored by Rep. Thomas Jenckes of Rhode Island and put before the House of
Representatives in December 1865).
60. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 155 (“[N]ewspapers readily ascribed
corruption to any convention where a rich man was involved.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra
note 59, at 18–19.
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1880s had not fundamentally changed since the 1850s, the rise of
ambitious national magazines and big city newspapers with large
readerships put a new spotlight on the parties’ campaign finance
practices.61 For example, the journalist E.L. Godkin described the spoils
system as “[t]he seat of all the fraud and corruption” that plagued the
government.62 In the 1870s, reformers opposed to political assessments
began to win public opinion to their side. 63 Even President Ulysses
Grant—a practitioner of patronage politics himself—conceded that the
spoils system “does not secure the best men, and often not even fit men,
for public place.”64
Inspired by civil service reforms in Britain, American reformers
sought to establish a professional civil service, one that would be
selected on the basis of merit rather than partisan affiliation. 65
Reformers hoped that a nonpartisan civil service would reinvigorate
American government, making it more efficient and competent.66
Although state and local organizations spearheaded the civil service
campaign in the 1870s, the various reform groups coalesced in 1881 into
the National Civil Service Reform League (NCSRL), which became a
potent lobbying group.67
A deep distrust of the parties shaped the reformers’ worldview.
According to advocates of civil service reform, the Republican and
Democratic parties served as the principal sources of government
corruption and incompetence.68 Reformers complained that “[p]arty
61. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 231 (“Politics may have been no more
putrid than in the 1850s, but the metropolitan press had greater resources for nosing out
scandals and broadcasting them to a wider audience.”).
62. THOMAS C. REEVES, GENTLEMAN BOSS: THE LIFE OF CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR 63
(1975).
63. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 155; REEVES, supra note 62, at 55–56.
64. REEVES, supra note 62, at 56.
65. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 55; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 16 (“The bill
Jenckes introduced was patterned on British precedent.”).
66. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 257 (“Increasingly in the postwar period, liberal
reformers turned to civil service reform as a panacea for all the ills of the nation—
economic, social, moral, as well as political.”); SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at
235 (reformers hoped that civil service reform would make “the government machinery
run smoothly and cheaply” and nonpartisan public policy experts would “master the
intricacies of their field in ways that no party-packed body could.”).
67. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 262–63.
68. MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 22 (“Party government, they believed, was
conducted by ignorant, untrained men; it was haphazard and irresponsible; and, perhaps
above all, it made unwise policies.”); SPROAT, supra note 42, at 257 (“Liberals saw political
patronage as the root and source of bribery and corruption, a symbol of national shame
and demoralization.”), 270 (noting that the reformers were “[d]istrustful of democracy”
and “resented bitterly the power and authority that ‘lesser men’ than they exercised.”).
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managers passed over educated, qualified candidates and distributed
offices to ‘hacks’ and ward-heelers who had done their bidding during
campaigns and would continue to serve them in government.” 69
But class resentments played a role in the reformers’ thinking as
well. The push for civil service reform originated among patrician elites
and the rising professional classes who sought to fill the ranks of public
offices with the “best men,” by which they meant college-educated men
from privileged and wealthy backgrounds. 70 Upper-class claimed that
the spoils system put in positions of authority irresponsible officials
empowered by ignorant masses of lower class voters. 71 Many supporters
of civil service reform viewed ordinary voters with suspicion and hoped
the “responsible body of men in society” would “be in a position to
counter the rising influence of ignorance and sheer numbers” in
American politics.72 As the historian John Sproat has explained, many
civil service reformers viewed ordinary voters with disdain and believed
that “the American people as a whole were unworthy of
self-government.”73 Accordingly, as Theda Skocpol has argued, the civil
service reformers “hoped to take government out of the hands of party
politicians and give it instead to socially respectable, educated people—
like themselves.”74 In the reformers’ view, therefore, “good government”
meant having federal offices occupied by the educated upper classes and
not by the “masses.”75
To restore “good government” and reduce the influence of the major
political parties, civil service reformers proposed outlawing political

69. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 269.
70. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 53; MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC
LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 272 (1977); SPROAT, supra note 42, at 269,
277 (describing the reformers’ preference for officeholders “whose breeding, education and
‘natural proclivities’ set them far above the masses and endowed them with the wisdom
and restraint essential to the proper functioning of government.”); MCCORMICK, supra
note 36, at 234.
71. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 257 (“In the hands of irresponsible party leaders the
spoils system became a dangerous weapon, for it enabled the politicians to regiment great
masses of voters and to create, in effect, an army of mercenaries always ready at a
command to overpower decent citizens.”); SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 53–54; REEVES,
supra note 62, at 64 (“reformers . . . believed that the spoils system was not only
squandering taxpayers’ money but—even more important—was also debasing and
crippling democratic government.”).
72. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 250, 259–60.
73. Id. at 271.
74. SKOCPOL, supra note 11, at 262–63.
75. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 271.
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assessments.76 A first step toward that epochal campaign finance
reform came in the 1870s when Congress prohibited federal officials
and employees from soliciting campaign contributions from other
federal officials and employees.77 The Supreme Court upheld the law
against a constitutional challenge in an 1882 case, observing that:
[i]f contributions from those in public employment may be solicited
by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a
request may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet the demand
may be treated by those having the power of removal as a breach of
some supposed duty, growing out of the political relations of the
parties. Contributions secured under such circumstances will quite
as likely be made to avoid the consequences of the personal
displeasure of a superior, as to promote the political views of the
contributor,—to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a
political privilege.78

In 1876, New York Governor Samuel Tilden, the Democratic
presidential nominee, campaigned against the patronage system, a sign
that civil service reform had arrived as a national political issue. 79 In
1880, the Republican presidential nominee, James Garfield, conceded to
political reality by endorsing—albeit in vague and evasive terms—a
modest form of civil service reform.80
The turning point came in 1881 when Senator George Pendleton of
Ohio authored a bill to establish a nonpartisan civil service and
eliminate political assessments.81 Pendleton was an unlikely promoter
of civil service reform.82 He had deep ties to the railroad industry and
was a partisan Democrat who had defended slavery during the Civil
War.83 But he eventually came around to the cause of civil service
76. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 235 (“A merit system and an end to
assessments . . . would be the first essential steps before government could be entrusted
with new responsibilities.”).
77. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY,
1869–1901, 333–34 (1958); FOWLER, supra note 22, at 150 (“In 1870, a law had been
passed forbidding the solicitation by or giving of contributions or gifts to superior
officers.”).
78. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 374 (1882).
79. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 98.
80. JUSTUS DOENECKE, THE PRESIDENCIES OF JAMES A. GARFIELD AND CHESTER A.
ARTHUR 40 (1981) (noting that Garfield “vaguely endorsed tenure for civil servants while
specifically promising to consult party leaders on major appointments.”).
81. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 107; WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA, supra note 77, at
335.
82. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 95.
83. Id.
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reform and pursued it doggedly.84 Pendleton’s bill proposed the
establishment of a professional, merit-based civil service system
whereby federal employees would be selected on the basis of competitive
examinations and political assessments would be rendered a thing of
the past.85
Despite Pendleton’s efforts, his civil service bill would likely have
died in committee if not for a national tragedy later that year. In the
summer of 1881, a deranged office-seeker assassinated President James
Garfield.86 Although Garfield never seriously challenged the patronage
system during his brief time in office, his assassination galvanized the
nation in favor of civil service reform.87 As the historian John Sproat
observed, “[t]he single rash act of a disgruntled petty spoilsman did as
much for the cause of political reform as all the speech-making and
writing of the liberal reformers.”88 After the president’s death, the
NCSRL printed posters of Garfield emblazoned with his pro-reform
statements.89 In the words of the historian Ari Hoogenboom, “Garfield
dead proved more valuable to reformers than Garfield alive.”90 During
the 1882 midterm elections, the NCSRL publicized the names of
members of Congress who opposed civil service reform and backed
candidates who supported Pendleton’s bill. 91
During the 1882 campaign, civil service reform became an issue that
sharply divided candidates along partisan lines. 92 Democrats embraced
the ban on political assessments because Republicans—the incumbent
party in the White House since 1869—benefited disproportionately from

84. Id.
85. REEVES, supra note 62, at 323; KARABELL, supra note 41, at 95.
86. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 65; SPROAT, supra note 42, at 264 (“it was the
assassination of Garfield that opened the way for passage of the Pendleton bill”);
KARABELL, supra note 41, at 105 (“It took the assassination of a president to jump-start
the process.”).
87. DOENECKE, supra note 80, at 40–41, 44–45 (Garfield “was not above making
promises of patronage and influence.”), 95 (“To many, the spoils system itself was
responsible for Guiteau’s act.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 209 (“Guiteau’s bullet
advanced the civil service reform movement.”).
88. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 264.
89. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 212.
90. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 212.
91. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66; SPROAT, supra note 42, at 264; HOOGENBOOM,
supra note 59, at 233.
92. For an analysis of the partisan divide over the Pendleton bill, see HOOGENBOOM,
supra note 59, at 231–34.
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the patronage system.93 Shut out of power at the federal level for more
than a decade, Democrats saw nothing to lose—as well as a significant
public relations advantage to gain—by supporting an end to
assessments.94 Republicans, in contrast, had no incentive to embrace
reform of a system they had thrived under for years.
The stunningly one-sided outcome of the 1882 elections broke the
deadlock. Democrats won by landslide margins in the congressional
elections, bringing an end to the Republican House majority and
completely changing the political calculus.95 The public mood was
unmistakable. Many incumbent Republicans who opposed reform lost
their seats, and many Democrats who supported reform won. 96
Republicans suffered such severe losses in the 1882 elections that the
lame-duck Republican Congress feared the pro-reform tide might sweep
the Republicans out of the White House as well in 1884. 97 Above all, the
1882 election results made clear that Democrats would hold a huge
majority in the House of Representatives in 1883, which meant
Republicans needed to act quickly before the new Congress was
seated.98
Ironically, the 1882 election results also gave the Republicans an
opportunity. The lame-duck Republican majority realized that, by
belatedly embracing civil service reform in the closing days of their

93. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 65; SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 235
(“Democrats saw the bill as a chance to deprive Republicans of their campaign funds, by
shutting off the flow of assessments.”).
94. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 235 (explaining that Democrats saw
benefits “of donning the garments of reform to improve their political image”).
95. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 100–01 (“In the House of Representatives, nearly
forty incumbents were defeated, almost all of them Republicans. That was almost
unprecedented.”); SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 235 (explaining that
“Republicans lost the House in 1882 by thumping majorities”); HOOGENBOOM, supra
note 59, at 234.
96. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66 (“Although it is difficult to discern the actual
effect of this campaign, the November election routed Republicans in those states where
reform organizations were strongest.”); SPROAT, supra note 42, at 264 (“In 1882 [the
NCSRL] claimed credit, probably deserved, for the election of a sizable contingent of new
congressmen pledged to vote for the Pendleton bill.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 236
(“Political assessments had proved a liability”).
97. REEVES, supra note 62, at 322 (“GOP Congressmen sought to protect the jobs of
current officeholders in the all-too-likely event of defeat in 1884.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra
note 59, at 236 (“The outlook for the Republican party in 1884 was not promising.”).
98. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 101 (“The balance shifted decisively in favor of the
Democrats, who in the Forty-eighth Congress would enjoy a majority of nearly two to one
in the House.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 237.
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legislative session, they could turn the tables on the Democrats. 99
Having already filled the federal bureaucracy with members of their
own party, Republicans would now be in a position to invoke the
Pendleton Act as a shield to prevent a future Democratic president from
replacing them.100 In short, Republicans could have their cake and eat it
too.101 Not surprisingly, therefore, civil service reform suddenly gained
broad support among congressional Republicans in the weeks after the
1882 elections.102 If reform had to happen, the Republicans reasoned, it
was better to do it on their terms when their appointees held office.103
Conversely, many of the Democrats who opposed assessments also
had a change of heart, realizing that it would be better for their
partisan interests to delay reform until a Democratic president occupied
the White House.104 Consequently, congressional Democrats pressured
Pendleton to delay his bill until after the 1884 elections, but he refused
and the Senate took up the bill in December 1882. 105 Democrats were
outraged. When the congressional debate on the Pendleton bill began,
Henry Adams observed that the somber mood in Congress was that of a
“pack of whipped boys.”106 Democrats never forgave Pendleton for
betraying the party and treated him like a pariah for the rest of his
political career.107
Although momentum in Congress had moved sharply in favor of
Pendleton’s reform bill, the legislation still needed the support of the
99. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66 (“passage of a bill while Arthur was in office
would mean that Republican appointees could be frozen in place if the Democrats actually
came to power”); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 237.
100. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 106 (“[T]he outgoing Republicans could cram the
bureaucracy with loyalists . . . . [T]he Pendleton Act would prevent Democrats from
removing the grandfathered Republican appointees.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at
237.
101. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 237 (“Republicans supported the [Pendleton] bill
for two reasons: they could pose as reformers in 1884 and win back lost support, and they
could ‘freeze’ Republicans in office behind civil service rules if the Democrats would win
the election” in 1884.).
102. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 103 (“Within weeks of the defeat, they became
zealous converts to the cause of civil service reform.”).
103. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 235 (“Suddenly, Republicans saw the
need for civil service reform, and immediately.”).
104. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66; KARABELL, supra note 41, at 105 (“It soon
became clear that the two parties had traded places. A number of prominent southern
Democrats lined up against the bill, and the Republicans tripped over themselves to
support it.”).
105. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66.
106. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 105.
107. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 238
(“Pendleton’s strong stand for reform . . . ultimately cost him his senatorial career.”).
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new president, Chester Arthur. In light of his political background as a
machine politician, many reformers feared that Arthur would veto the
bill or otherwise obstruct it.108 By freeing officeholders “of the obligation
to contribute time or money to political campaigns,” the Pendleton bill
represented a direct attack on the campaign finance system that Arthur
had promoted and defended for decades.109 It not only banned political
assessments but also included provisions to bar Members of Congress
from fundraising in federal buildings and to outlaw the practice of
removing federal employees who refused to make political
contributions.110 None of those provisions seemed likely to win Arthur’s
approval. As the historian Zachary Karabell has noted, Arthur “was,
after all, the spoilsman who became president, and no one expected him
to be an advocate for civil service reform.”111
Indeed, Arthur had spent his entire political career deeply enmeshed
in the old campaign finance system. No one knew the old ways better
than he did. His involvement in the assessment system began twenty
years before in 1862, when Arthur paid his first political assessment—
$250—while serving on the staff of New York Governor Edwin
Morgan.112 Two years later, during the 1864 election, Arthur made a
name for himself by skillfully wringing out large amounts of
assessments from postmasters in order to help finance President
Lincoln’s reelection campaign.113 His success caught the White House’s
attention. After Lincoln’s victory, Arthur received an invitation to the
presidential inauguration ceremony, a tacit recognition of his
fundraising talents.114 Four years later, during the 1868 election,
Arthur once again proved a highly effective fundraiser for the
Republican Party.115
By the 1870s, Arthur had built such a strong national reputation as a
Republican fundraiser that he was rewarded with appointment as
Collector of the Port of New York, the single most lucrative patronage
position in the country.116 Half of all federal revenues came from
108. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 110.
109. REEVES, supra note 62, at 323; SPROAT, supra note 42, at 265 (The Pendleton Act
“removed classified employees from the direct control of party bosses by prohibiting
campaign assessments and indiscriminate removals from office for political reasons.”).
110. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA, supra note 77, at 335.
111. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 110.
112. REEVES, supra note 62, at 37.
113. Id. at 38.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 76–77.
116. SCOTT S. GREENBERGER, THE UNEXPECTED PRESIDENT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
CHESTER A. ARTHUR 79 (2017); REEVES, supra note 62, at 60, 62; RON CHERNOW, GRANT

[5] CHESTER ARTHUR'S GHOST - BP (EDITS INCORPORATED) (DO NOT DELETE)

794

MERCER LAW REVIEW

4/13/2020 10:51 AM

[Vol. 71

customs duties collected at the port of New York. 117 As head of the New
York Custom House, the Port Collector generated $36,000 annually in
political assessments from customhouse employees.118 Arthur proved
highly skilled at managing the Custom House’s assessment system. 119
One of Arthur’s subordinates at the Custom House called him “probably
the ablest politician that has ever filled the collector’s chair.” 120 He also
enjoyed himself. Personable and outgoing, Arthur stayed up late
drinking, eating, and smoking with his political allies and then usually
arrived at work at the Custom House at 1 p.m. 121
He did not keep normal hours because he did not have a normal
government job. As holder of the most important patronage
appointment in the country, he used his position to raise funds for the
Republican Party and to secure favors for Republican leaders. 122 In one
case, for example, he personally ensured that 205 cases of champagne
passed through customs and made their way to President Grant in the
White House.123 Even Democrats liked him. He cut mutually beneficial
deals with Tammany Hall, the Democratic Party’s political machine in
New York, while simultaneously building up the Republican
organization in the state.124 As his biographer Thomas Reeves
explained, Arthur was “a professional spoilsman, an administrator of
patronage, an architect of party victory.” 125 He was, in short, the
consummate political operator.126
But as a result, Arthur did not have clean hands when it came to
campaign finance practices. Worse yet, he was not above lying about his
role in the assessment system. For example, when growing public
outrage at political assessments forced the Grant Administration to
launch an investigation, Arthur insisted that he had no personal

736 (2017) (“Seated on his new patronage throne, Arthur would make $50,000 a year, a
salary equal to the President’s.”).
117. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 61 (“The Port of New York was the lifeline of
American government, accounting for well over 50 percent of all federal revenues.”).
118. REEVES, supra note 62, at 63.
119. Id. at 70–71.
120. Id. at 71.
121. REEVES, supra note 62, at 72; GREENBERGER, supra note 116, at 81.
122. REEVES, supra note 62, at 72–73.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 74.
125. Id. at 70.
126. Id. at 73 (“professional politicians in both parties recognized him as one of
Conkling’s most effective lieutenants: a schemer with influence in the party’s highest
circles, and a spoilsman whose concern for power interested him in the smallest public
job.”).
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involvement in any wrongdoing.127 He claimed that his subordinates,
acting “wholly without my knowledge,” had “voluntarily raised a sum of
money to be devoted towards paying the legitimate expense of the
Republican Campaign Com[mittee].”128 The truth was Arthur was
personally and deeply involved in collecting involuntary assessments,
otherwise he would never have received the port collector position in
the first place. But nothing came of the investigation, and Arthur
remained in his post.
The experience of being investigated did not dim Arthur’s ardor for
collecting campaign cash. In 1876, he played a prominent role in raising
campaign funds for the Republican presidential ticket. 129 During the
campaign, the Custom House informed all of its employees to report to
Colonel Joseph Pinckney, Arthur’s close friend and fellow Republican,
and pay four percent of their annual salary to him as a “voluntary”
contribution to the Republican Party.130 To collect the assessments from
Arthur’s employees quickly and efficiently, Pinckney set up shop in an
office across the street from the Custom House. 131 Arthur’s friend, Silas
Burt, observed that Pinckney’s conspicuous presence outside the
Custom House, combined with his aggressive solicitation of “donations”
from Custom House employees, represented the use of “intimidation to
crush out any spark of revolt” that reluctant employees might have
harbored.132
The exact amount of assessments raised by Arthur and Pinckney
during the 1876 campaign is unknown, but the extraordinary amount of
Arthur’s contributions to Republican candidates that year gives a hint
at the scale of the Custom House assessments. 133 Over the course of the
1876 election, Arthur wrote checks amounting to over $72,000 to
Republican state and national party leaders. 134 By way of contrast,
Abraham Lincoln’s entire presidential campaign cost $100,000 in 1860.
But Arthur was far from alone in raising campaign money. Many other
Republican-controlled federal agencies and departments levied
127. Id. at 78 (“Until after the receipt of your letter none of these facts were known to
me.”).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 102 (“Campaign funds were badly needed by Republicans in 1876, and
predictably they turned to the New York Customhouse, where Collector Arthur was
firmly determined to see that each party appointee paid every penny of his assigned
‘donation.’”).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 102–03.
134. Id. at 102.
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assessments as well.135 In an October 1876 letter, the
Republican-appointed postmaster in Milwaukee privately acknowledged
that “[f]ederal officials have been bled until I am ashamed to ask for
more.”136
The Republican nominee in 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes, benefited
from the assessment system during his successful presidential
campaign.137 But he privately condemned assessments and told the
reformer Carl Schurz that, once in office, “this whole assessment
business will go up, ‘hook, line and sinker.’” 138 Hayes tried to make good
on his promise.139 After his victory in the 1876 election, he attempted to
ban political assessments and establish a nonpartisan civil service. 140
But first, he needed to prove how corrupt the old system was. In April
1877, one month after his inauguration as president, Hayes ordered a
federal investigation into alleged cases of corruption at customhouses
along the Atlantic seaboard from Boston in the northeast to New
Orleans in the Deep South.141
Arthur found himself at the center of the investigation when federal
authorities took a particular interest in the “conduct of business at the
New-York Customhouse.”142 President Hayes appointed John Jay—
grandson of the first chief justice—to lead the investigative
commission.143 The New York Times praised the investigation, declaring
that New York’s “Custom-house is, in fact, the most complete and
offensive example of the need of that reform in the civil service which
President Hayes had promised that could be found in the country.” 144
Nearly ninety witnesses testified, including Arthur himself, and the
commission amassed detailed records of Custom House practices. 145 In a
public investigation, the Jay Commission revealed pervasive waste,
inefficiency, and corruption at the New York Custom House, including

135. Id. at 103 (“Outside New York the exaction of funds from government workers
was also carried out vigorously.”).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 104.
138. Id.
139. For an analysis of the Hayes Administration’s maladroit efforts at civil service
reform, see HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 135–78.
140. REEVES, supra note 62, at 113, 121, 134; FOWLER, supra note 22, at 169
(“President Hayes and Postmaster General Key also tried to divorce the postal service
from party management and to abolish political assessments.”).
141. REEVES, supra note 62, at 110, 112, 114.
142. Id. at 114.
143. Id. at 113; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 151.
144. REEVES, supra note 62, at 113.
145. Id. at 114–15.
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rampant cases of smuggling, bribes, and outrageous accounting
errors.146
Despite the overwhelming evidence of widespread corruption at the
New York Custom House, Arthur took a combative and defensive
approach to the Jay Commission. In his testimony, he claimed that only
qualified applicants received government jobs under his watch.147
Although he conceded that instances of corruption had occurred at the
Custom House, he insisted that “nearly all” episodes predated his
tenure as port collector.148 He also claimed that there was little hard
evidence of a pervasive problem of corruption at the Custom House. 149
Arthur’s absurd defenses fooled no one. The Jay Commission ultimately
produced a scathing report that singled out for censure the New York
Custom House’s chronic “mismanagement and corruption.” 150 As if that
were not embarrassing enough for Arthur, the Commission issued a
follow-up report in which it expressly criticized the Custom House
leadership and concluded that the “evidence show[ed] a degree and
extent of carelessness which we think should not be permitted to
continue.”151 White House advisers urged the President to remove
Arthur immediately, describing the port collector as “among the chief
corrupters of our political life.”152 Convinced by the vast body of
evidence against the port collector, Hayes ultimately demanded
Arthur’s resignation.153
Arthur, however, would not back down. He refused to resign and
charged the Jay Commission with conducting an inadequate
investigation that failed “to seek for evidence on both sides.” 154 In a
shameless display, Arthur had the nerve to present himself as one of
the great government reformers in history. In a published letter, he
declared that “civil service reform has been more faithfully observed,
and more thoroughly carried out in the New York Custom House, than
in any other branch or Department of the Government, either under the
present or any past national administration.” 155 Arthur’s long service to
the patronage system was not forgotten by his allies in the Senate. New

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 115–16.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 118, 120.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 121.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
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York Senator Roscoe Conkling and other key Republican defenders of
the patronage system blocked Hayes’s efforts to fire Arthur. 156
Congressional Republicans accused Hayes of unilaterally disarming the
Republican Party’s fundraising capabilities by banning political
assessments and urged him to rescind the executive order. 157 Under
intense pressure from his party, Hayes announced that federal
employees and officeholders going forward could make “voluntary”
political contributions.158 In a sign of just how ineffective Hayes’s
reform efforts had been, the Republican Party raised $93,000 in
campaign contributions from federal officeholders during the 1878
congressional elections.159
But the tide was turning against Arthur. In the summer of 1878, yet
more evidence of corruption at the New York Custom House came to
light.160 A Treasury Department investigation revealed that Arthur had
ignored $42,000 in fraud perpetrated by Custom House clerks and had
not only retained all of the clerks involved in the crime, but had
subsequently promoted at least one of them.161 Congress also learned
that New York merchants frequently complained about Arthur’s habit
of showing up many hours late to work. 162 With the evidence of Arthur’s
mismanagement reaching monumental proportions, Hayes suspended
him during a congressional recess and later removed him permanently
from the post of port collector.163
Despite his public disgrace, Arthur remained unrepentant. He
claimed that his suspension as port collector “was a violation of every
principle of justice.”164 In any case, he landed on his feet. The
Republican Party knew they had no better fundraiser than Chester
Arthur, and in February 1879 he took over as head of the Republican
Party’s central committee in New York, where he was responsible for
managing the party’s statewide campaigns. 165 Ironically, as the top
Republican operative in New York, Arthur solicited “voluntary
contributions” from all state and federal officeholders, including from

156. Id. at 130–31; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 162–63.
157. REEVES, supra note 62, at 134.
158. Id.
159. FOWLER, supra note 22, at 171.
160. REEVES, supra note 62, at 135–36.
161. Id. at 135.
162. Id. at 136.
163. Id. at 136, 147; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 167.
164. REEVES, supra note 62, at 142.
165. Id. at 150, 155 (“Chester Arthur was in charge of the entire Republican
campaign.”).
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his former employees at the New York Custom House.166 Just as before,
any employee who refused to pay the campaign “donation” faced the
very real threat of dismissal.167
Incredibly, Arthur soon found himself as the Republican nominee for
vice president. In 1880, Ohio Congressman James Garfield—the
Republican presidential nominee—chose Arthur as his running mate, a
selection designed to appease the patronage-dependent Stalwart faction
of the Republican Party.168 With good reason, Arthur’s nomination
appalled reformers. Senator Sherman of Ohio complained that Arthur
“never held an office except the one he was removed from,” and he
warned that Arthur’s “nomination attaches to the ticket all the odium of
machine politics.”169 Likewise, the writer and social activist Charles
Eliot Norton described Arthur’s nomination for vice president as a
“miserable farce.”170
In light of Arthur’s unsavory political track record, reformers
understandably feared the worst when he suddenly became president.
The writer Henry Adams warned that Arthur’s “administration . . . will
be the centre for every element of corruption, south and north. The
outlook is very discouraging.”171 Such fears seemed well-founded when
the new President expressed reservations about the Pendleton bill in
his first message to Congress in December 1881.172 Asserting that
“opinion has been widely divided upon the wisdom and practicability” of
the civil service reform proposals, Arthur warned that any changes to
the system must be “gradual” in nature. 173
But Arthur was first and foremost a politician, and political realities
forced his hand.174 The 1882 election “converted” Arthur to the cause of
166. Id. at 157.
167. Id.
168. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 183.
169. GREENBERGER, supra note 116, at 125.
170. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 183.
171. Id. at 214.
172. REEVES, supra note 62, at 322–23; SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 65; KARABELL,
supra note 41, at 95; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 215–16.
173. See Message of the President of the United States (Dec. 5, 1881), OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN
OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1881/message-of-the-president
(“[O]pinion has been widely divided upon the wisdom and practicability of the various
reformatory schemes which have been suggested and of certain proposed regulations
governing appointments to public office . . . . The subject under discussion is one of grave
importance. The evils which are complained of cannot be eradicated at once; the work
must be gradual.”).
174. REEVES, supra note 62, at 322; KARABELL, supra note 41, at 110 (“Once again,
however, Arthur had an astute sense of public mood.”).
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civil service reform by demonstrating to him that the political winds
had changed once and for all.175 The election results made clear that the
Republican Party would continue to suffer electoral losses if it did not
respond to the new public mood in favor of reform. 176 Therefore, in one
of the most remarkable surprises of nineteenth-century political
history, Arthur abandoned his previous reservations and
enthusiastically embraced the Pendleton bill. 177 As he explained in a
December 1882 message to Congress, “the people of the country,
apparently without distinction of party, have in various ways and upon
frequent occasions given expression to their earnest wish for prompt
and definite action.”178 Of political assessments, he frankly admitted
that it went “without saying that such contributions are not
voluntary.”179 He thus implicitly acknowledged that his previous
statements about the “voluntary” nature of political assessments were
untrue.180
With President Arthur’s firm support, the lame-duck Republican
Congress approved the Pendleton civil service bill by large margins: 38–
5 in the Senate (with 33 abstentions) and 155–47 in the House (with 87

175. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 237 (“President Arthur, too, had been ‘converted’
by the election of 1882.”).
176. REEVES, supra note 62, at 322 (“The election results in November, especially from
New York, appeared to confirm conclusively the view that public opinion had soured on
the spoils system.”); KARABELL, supra note 41, at 110 (“Once again, however, Arthur had
an astute sense of public mood.”).
177. REEVES, supra note 62, at 322 (“The President captured the mood of the day in his
message to Congress.”), 323 (“He also extended his support for the Pendleton bill,
awaiting consideration by the Senate, which meant that he had abandoned his opposition
to competitive examinations.”); HERBERT J. CLANCY, S.J., THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF
1880, 264–65 (1958).
178. REEVES, supra note 62, at 323. See also Message of the President of the United
States (Dec. 4, 1882), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1882/message.
I felt bound to intimate my doubts whether they, or any of them, would afford
adequate remedy for the evils which they aimed to correct. I declared,
nevertheless, that if the proposed measures should prove acceptable to
Congress, they would receive the unhesitating support of the Executive. Since
these suggestions were submitted for your consideration there has been no
legislation upon the subject to which they relate, but there has meanwhile been
an increase in the public interest in that subject, and the people of the country,
apparently without distinction of party, have in various ways, and upon
frequent occasions, given expression to their earnest wish for prompt and
definite action. In my judgment, such action should no longer be postponed. Id.
179. KARABELL, supra note 41, at 105; HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 237.
180. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 237.

[5] CHESTER ARTHUR'S GHOST - BP (EDITS INCORPORATED) (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

CHESTER ARTHUR’S GHOST

4/13/2020 10:51 AM

801

abstentions)—and Arthur signed the bill into law in January 1883. 181
As Arthur’s biographer Thomas Reeves pointed out, “[t]he irony of
ex-Collector Arthur, the ‘Gentleman Boss,’ affixing his signature to the
nation’s first civil service reform legislation was not entirely
overlooked.”182
To be sure, before approving the bill, Republicans weakened the
Pendleton Act’s anti-assessment provisions. The law, as enacted, only
banned coerced contributions. 183 Federal employees could still make
voluntary contributions to their party.184 Moreover, the amended law
did not outlaw assessments for state and local elections, and it only
gradually phased in the merit system. 185 When enacted in 1883, the
Pendleton Act only moved about 11% of the 131,208 federal civil service
positions into the merit system.186 By 1900, that figure had risen to 46%
of 208,000 positions in the executive civil service. 187 But in the
meantime, the growth in the number of non-classified (that is,
non-merit based) positions still gave politicians many opportunities to
reward their friends and allies.188
Accordingly, the scale of the “rotation in office” system remained
enormous for decades to come.189 For example, when the Democratic
president Grover Cleveland took office in 1885, his administration
purged 40,000 Republican postmasters from the Post Office
Department.190 Cleveland claimed that he was merely removing

181. REEVES, supra note 62, at 324; KARABELL, supra note 41, at 105–06;
HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 246, 248–49, 253.
182. REEVES, supra note 62, at 324.
183. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 66.
184. Id.
185. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA, supra note 77, at 336, 340, 335 (noting the law’s
“loopholes.”); CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 46 (“the effect of merit reform was limited and
slow in coming”); SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 69; SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 74 (“civil
service reform did not alter the structure of party politics in the United States in the
direction the reformers desired, at least not during the nineteenth century.”); SPROAT,
supra note 42, at 265 (“Only about fourteen thousand government workers came under
the classification provision of the [Pendleton] Act.”).
186. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 69.
187. Id. at 69.
188. SHEFTER, supra note 7, at 74 (“During the twenty years following the passage of
the Pendleton Act, the federal bureaucracy grew more rapidly than did the number of
positions in the classified civil service.”); SPROAT, supra note 42, at 265 (“Cleveland all but
ignored the spirit of the merit system and awarded jobs almost solely on the basis of
service to the Democratic party.”).
189. FOWLER, supra note 22, at 182 (“The Act hardly affected the great patronage of
the Post Office Department at first, as the 47,000 postmasters were not included”).
190. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 236.
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“incompetents” from federal service, but partisan considerations drove
his decision-making.191 Privately, he complained of the reformers’
“supercilious self-righteousness.”192 But the effort to undermine civil
service reform was not limited to Democrats. When the Republican
president Benjamin Harrison took office in 1889, his administration
drove out over 50,000 Democratic postmasters. 193 A truly nonpartisan,
independent civil service would not become a reality until the Hatch Act
of 1939.194
The Pendleton Act’s most immediate impact came in the area of
campaign finance law. Although the effort to establish a civil service
based on merit only made slow progress, the anti-assessment provisions
proved quite successful. One of the reasons why was the remarkable
fact that President Arthur faithfully implemented the Pendleton Act
reforms.195 Thanks in no small part to Arthur’s efforts, political
assessments gradually disappeared from the political landscape.196
Although the Pendleton Act left open the possibility of “voluntary”
campaign contributions by officeholders, both parties complied with the
law to a surprising degree.197
Arthur’s greatest contribution to the Act’s success came through his
support for the Civil Service Commission, the ranks of which he filled
with committed reformers.198 It was a crucial step. Early on, pro-reform
Senator Henry Dawes had warned that the success of the Pendleton Act
depended on good faith enforcement by a “friendly president.”199 A

191. SPROAT, supra note 42, at 265.
192. Id. at 267.
193. CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 41; SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 236–
37.
194. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 237 (“Not until the Progressive Era
would civil service reform take deep and meaningful form in the federal government.
Even then, the use of government patronage to serve partisan purposes continued, often
in pretty flagrant form, up to the passage of the Hatch Act of 1939.”). Hatch Act, 53 Stat.
1147 (1939) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1503 (2019).
195. REEVES, supra note 62, at 327.
196. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 74 (“[I]n successive annual reports, the Civil
Service Commission declared that political assessments on officeholders had virtually
disappeared from the federal service.”).
197. Id. (“Despite a weak antiassessment clause in the Pendleton Act, compliance
rather than evasion was becoming the norm.”). Violations of the ban on political
assessments occurred with diminishing frequency until by 1909 they had “practically
ceased.” See FOWLER, supra note 22, at 300 (“Compulsory assessments by Government
officials or in Government buildings had by 1909 practically ceased.”).
198. REEVES, supra note 62, at 324 (“Arthur’s selections for the commission were
unanimously approved by reformers.”); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 254.
199. REEVES, supra note 62, at 324.
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hostile president, in contrast, could refuse to appoint commissioners or
decline to adopt rules to enforce the Pendleton Act. 200 But Arthur
honored the reformers’ intentions by honestly implementing the law. 201
He accepted almost all of the commissioners’ proposed new civil service
rules and remained steadfastly supportive of reform principles until his
presidential term ended in March 1885. 202 Arthur’s support invigorated
the Civil Service Commission and ensured that it got off to a strong
start.203 In the closing days of his presidency, the commissioners
publicly thanked Arthur for his vital backing of their efforts. 204 In an
official report, the commissioners explained that their enforcement
“functions cannot be successfully discharged without the constant, firm,
and friendly support of the President. That support has never failed.
The Commission has never asked advice or an exercise of authority on
the part of the President which has been refused.” 205
Arthur left office in 1885 as one of the most surprising reform
presidents in history.206 But the success of the Pendleton Act’s
campaign finance reforms did not end the role of money in politics. The
truth was the parties had found a new and even more effective way of
raising large amounts of money. Accordingly, as the political scientist
Stephen Skowronek observed, “compliance with the antiassessment
clause became more convenient as parties developed alternative means
for financing national campaigns.” 207 Corporations and the wealthy
would become the new sources of campaign funds for the parties to tap.
IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
The accelerating ties between business and politicians became
apparent in the first election after the Pendleton Act’s enactment. The
1884 presidential election marked a momentous turning point in the
200. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 255; REEVES, supra note 62, at 324.
201. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 255; REEVES, supra note 62, at 327 (“Arthur
surprised many reformers by administering the Pendleton Act efficiently and
effectively.”).
202. HOOGENBOOM, supra note 59, at 255; REEVES, supra note 62, at 327 (“For the
remainder of its tenure, the administration, at all levels, evidenced a willingness to abide
by the principles of reform.”).
203. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 74.
204. REEVES, supra note 62, at 327.
205. Id.
206. KENNETH D. ACKERMAN, DARK HORSE: THE SURPRISE ELECTION AND POLITICAL
MURDER OF PRESIDENT JAMES A. GARFIELD 437 (2003) (“Reformers applauded Arthur
when he signed the landmark Pendleton Civil Service Act in 1883 and . . . . recognized his
term as being among the most scandal-free in recent memory.”).
207. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 74.

[5] CHESTER ARTHUR'S GHOST - BP (EDITS INCORPORATED) (DO NOT DELETE)

804

MERCER LAW REVIEW

4/13/2020 10:51 AM

[Vol. 71

history of campaign finance law. The ban on political assessments
severely restricted the incumbent Republican Party’s ability to raise
funds.208 Republican National Committee (RNC) operative James
Clarkson warned the railroad tycoon Jay Gould—a major donor to the
Republican Party—that campaign “[m]oney is coming in very slowly.”209
Clarkson complained that “[t]here is actually no money to appropriate,
or even to pay bills with.”210 During the 1884 campaign, President
Arthur (who had declined to run for reelection) refused to allow his
administration to shake down federal officeholders for political
contributions, which meant that the RNC found itself deeply in debt
and hovering on the “edge of bankruptcy.” 211
In contrast, the Democrats responded to the changing campaign
finance world more quickly and more effectively than the Republicans.
Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chair William Barnum had
deep ties to the iron and railroad industries, and he was exceptionally
talented at raising campaign funds. 212 As one Wisconsin political
operative observed, Barnum was “simply without a rival” in
fundraising.213 “He knows not only how to disburse money, but knows
how to raise it,” the operative explained. 214 “In the closing hours of the
battle, when it is desirable to use ‘party ammunition at short range,’
Barnum stands without a peer.”215 At Barnum’s request, businessmen
made huge donations to the Democratic Party in 1884, including
$16,000 from the banker Roswell Flower and $10,000 from the railroad
executive James J. Hill, huge sums for the 1880s. 216 Barnum himself
contributed $27,500.217 In the meantime, the Republicans’ money
shortfalls were so severe that the Republican nominee, Senator James
G. Blaine of Maine, found himself forced to spend $65,000 of his own
money on the campaign trail.218

208. SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, supra note 20, at 164–65; REEVES,
supra note 62, at 387.
209. REEVES, supra note 62, at 387 (emphasis omitted); SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, &
REBELLION, supra note 20, at 167.
210. SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, supra note 20, at 167.
211. REEVES, supra note 62, at 387; SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, supra
note 20, at 167, 294 (“Undoubtedly a more generous administration would have raised
more funds, and more funds might have saved New York.”).
212. SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, supra note 20, at 165.
213. Id.
214. Id. (emphasis omitted).
215. Id. (emphasis omitted).
216. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 148.
217. Id.
218. SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, supra note 20, at 167.
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By the end of the 1884 election, the DNC had raised about $460,000
and Republicans about $431,000.219 The relatively small fundraising
difference between the parties represented a huge victory for the
Democrats.220 The Democrats raised four times as much money in 1884
as they had in 1880.221 Republicans, who had held the White House for
twenty out of twenty-four years between 1860 and 1884, had used
assessments on federal officeholders to gain a decisive financial
advantage over the Democrats. Adoption of the Pendleton Act thus
meant that in 1884 the Democrats enjoyed a level playing field for the
first time in decades. Perhaps not coincidentally, Governor Grover
Cleveland of New York, the Democratic presidential nominee, narrowly
defeated Blaine in the 1884 election.222
But an even more important political development could be seen in
the fundraising tactics of the 1884 campaign. Individuals skilled at
raising money from private sources had become indispensable to the
parties. In 1884, for example, the Iowa Republican operative James
Clarkson raised $25,000 from Republican donors in just one small
city—Des Moines, Iowa—whereas ineffective fundraising tactics
generated only $5,000 in private contributions in the entire state of
Pennsylvania.223 After their defeat in 1884, Republicans realized they
needed more fundraisers like Clarkson in their ranks. To that end,
during the 1888 presidential campaign, the Republican National
Committee established businessmen’s “advisory committees” to raise
funds on behalf of the party and its candidates. 224 For example,
Philadelphia merchant and department store pioneer John Wanamaker
raised about $400,000 from manufacturers and other business interests
to support the Republican campaign. 225
With so much money pouring in from businesses and wealthy
individuals, and with public attention riveted by the Civil Service
Commission’s investigation of illegal patronage practices, the parties no
longer saw assessments on federal employees as a valuable source of
campaign funds.226 The simple fact was the effort to find loopholes in
219. Id. at 168.
220. Id. at 298 (“We can find plenty of reasons for Republicans losing in 1884. But the
lack of money made difficulties impossibilities and added to the risks.”).
221. Id. at 167.
222. Id. at 289.
223. SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, supra note 20, at 167.
224. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 74.
225. Id. at 74–75; ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 15–16 (2014).
226. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 75 (“As these resources were developed, the
importance of assessments on federal employees declined markedly.”).
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the anti-assessment clauses of the Pendleton Act “became more trouble
than it was worth.”227 Consequently, James Clarkson declared that he
would rather “try to raise $10,000 from . . . businessmen than $1,000
among office-holders.”228
In short, the political parties realized they could do an end run
around the reformers by getting contributions directly from wealthy
industrialists and financiers.229 Private campaign contributors gained
new influence and access as a result. For example, in gratitude to John
Wanamaker’s party fundraising efforts, President Benjamin Harrison
appointed Wanamaker to the post of Postmaster General, one of the
most important positions in the federal government in the nineteenth
century.230 Reformers viewed Harrison’s appointment of Wanamaker
and other business leaders “with horror” because they recognized that it
“brought the new alliance of spoilsmen and businessmen directly into
government.”231 But it was too late to turn back. A new campaign
finance system had taken root.
Campaign expenditures soared in the years following the Pendleton
Act. Whereas the Republicans spent slightly over $430,000 in the 1884
presidential campaign, the RNC spent $1.7 million in the 1892
presidential campaign.232 To raise such vast sums, the parties became
ever more dependent on corporations and the wealthy. In 1896, for
instance, the Republican presidential campaign of William McKinley
raised over $3 million, primarily from businesses, insurance companies,
factory owners, and financiers.233
Railroad corporations, in particular, emerged as prominent financiers
of both Democratic and Republican candidates.234 For example, the
Minnesota railroad baron James J. Hill poured money into state and
227. Id.
228. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22 at 150.
229. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 75 (“The Wanamaker committee reveals a
modernizing party adapting to new conditions, adopting its own innovative techniques,
and defying the designs of the civil service reformers.”).
230. Id. at 75 (noting that the appointment of Wanamaker and other contributors
represented, among other things, “repayment of . . . campaign debts”).
231. Id.
232. OVERACKER, supra note 19, at 71; SUMMERS, RUM, ROMANISM, & REBELLION, at
168.
233. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE, supra note 225, at 22–23. Some estimates put the
amount as high as $4 million. See LEWIS L. GOULD, GRAND OLD PARTY: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLICANS 125 (2003) (“the GOP raised impressive amounts of money, probably
between $3.5 and $4 million from eastern Republicans and corporate leaders fearful of a
Bryan victory.”)
234. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 161 (“If money dominated politics in
the Gilded Age, as critics claimed, the worst offender seemed to be railroad money.”).
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national Democratic campaigns. 235 In return, the Democratic Party
gave him extraordinary access to government officials—including
dinner with President Grover Cleveland—a degree of influence that
helped Hill block legislation hostile to his business interests. 236 Railroad
executives exercised power in states across the country, not just
Minnesota.237 In California, for example, railroad interests played such
a powerful role in the state’s politics that one observer quipped that the
Central Pacific Railroad put a collar on every state senator “so that if he
is lost or strays he may be recaptured and returned to his lawful
owners.”238
The Pendleton Act’s campaign finance reforms thus gave rise to
deeply ironic consequences. As Stephen Skowronek has noted:
With the decline of federal assessments, the reformers achieved one
of their strategic goals. But success came with the realization of one
of their most basic fears. This separation of politics and
administration did not provide a bulwark against the “money power”
in government; rather, it followed the fusion of party and big
business in American politics.239

Similarly, the historian Robert Mutch has explained that whereas
“business money originated inside the political system and was
controlled by politicians” before the Pendleton Act, “[t]he political elite
lost that control when they had to raise money outside the political
system by going hat in hand to the new corporate elite.”240
Money’s influence on elections would only grow stronger in the
twentieth century, despite the enactment of even more sweeping
campaign finance regulations than the Pendleton Act. For example, the
public revelation that corporations and insurance companies
contributed over $1,000,000 to Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 reelection
campaign created a national uproar, leading to a series of new federal
campaign finance laws, including a federal ban on corporate

235. Id. at 164.
236. Id. (“The purpose of company money was not so much to catch politicians’ ears as
to shut their ears to arguments from the other side”), 168 (campaign contributions “helped
him block measures more readily than it helped him pass them.”).
237. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 161–63 (discussing the influence of
railroads in states as geographically diverse as Vermont, New Jersey, Mississippi,
Kansas, Nebraska, and West Virginia).
238. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 170–71.
239. SKOWRONEK, supra note 31, at 75.
240. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE, supra note 225, at 25.
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contributions to candidates.241 But the underlying dynamics of money in
politics hardly changed at all. In 1912, the Democratic nominee,
Woodrow Wilson, self-righteously condemned the political influence of
corporations and the rich on the campaign trail, but he secretly received
huge influxes of cash from wealthy donors with strong ties to corporate
America.242 A Chicago plumbing tycoon, for example, gave the Wilson
campaign $40,000.243 As the historian John Milton Cooper, Jr. noted in
his biography of the twenty-eighth president, “this champion of
progressivism took money from the kind of people he was denouncing
on the hustings.”244
The reason was simple: campaigns are inherently expensive
propositions.245 Even in the 1880s, when the Pendleton Act was
adopted, campaign costs soared as the population of the United States
grew by millions with each passing decade. 246 Minor parties simply
could not compete with the massive expenditures of the two major
parties, the Democrats and Republicans. 247 Thus, the end of
assessments did not end the influence of money in politics, it simply
redirected the source and the flow of the money. 248 Worse yet, reformers
expected that eliminating assessments would make campaigns less
expensive, and therefore make smaller parties and underfunded
candidates more competitive.249 But instead it ushered in an era of even
more expensive campaigns and entrenched the Republican and
Democratic parties in power more deeply than ever before. In the
process, it made the parties’ deeply dependent on wealthy donors.

241. RAYMOND J. LA RAJA, SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM 50–51 (2008); MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE, supra note 225, at 29, 48–51;
ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 6–8 (1988).
242. JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., WOODROW WILSON: A BIOGRAPHY 154, 172 (2009).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. SUMMERS, PARTY GAMES, supra note 22, at 144 (“[T]he plain fact was that party
machinery could not get along without cash in hand. Pageantry carried a big pricetag.”).
246. Id. at 160 (“[W]ith the mass production of campaign materials, the 1880s saw
politics’ own industrial revolution . . . . [T]he day of shoestring campaigns was passing.”).
247. Id. at 158 (“If filling their financial needs was a distraction to the mainstream
parties, it was death to the minor ones.”).
248. Id. at 159 (“the very existence of a Labor Party made a powerful incentive for
corporations to open their purses to whatever alternative was available.”).
249. Id. (noting that reformers believed that “[a]bove all, cheaper campaigns would
open the way to candidates of more modest means”).
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V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, it has become fashionable to blame the problem of
money in politics on the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission.250 But history tells a different
story. The challenge of regulating campaign finance practices has
bedeviled democratic governments for over 100 years and will likely
continue to do so for decades to come. As Pamela Karlan and Samuel
Isaacharoff observed in a classic law review article two decades ago,
“money that reform squeezes out of the formal campaign process must
go somewhere.”251 Writing in the late 1990s, Karlan and Isaacharoff
warned that campaign finance reforms threatened to:
exacerbate the already disturbing trend toward politics being
divorced from the mediating influence of candidates and political
parties . . . . Without mediating institutional buffers, money becomes
the exclusive coin of the realm as politics pushes toward issue
advocacy by groups not engaged in the give and take of party and
coalitional politics.252

In their article, Karlan and Isaacharoff described campaign finance
developments in the late 1990s, but their analysis is equally applicable
to the campaign finance reforms of the 1880s. Instead of reducing the
influence of money in politics, the Pendleton Act simply reshaped the
landscape of campaign finance. Corporations and millionaires
supplanted the political parties as the driving force in campaign
fundraising, a development few would welcome, then or now.
Humility is thus in order. As the 2020 election approaches, promises
of “overturning Citizens United” have become commonplace on the
campaign trail.253 But reformers would be wise to learn from history’s

250. See, e.g., Alexander Burns, Seven 2020 Democrats Pledge to Focus First Bill on
Fighting
Corruption,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/us/politics/end-citizens-united-pledge.html.
251. Samuel Issaacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999).
252. Id. at 1714.
253. Eric Bradner, Bernie Sanders’ Supreme Court Litmus Test: Overturn Citizens
United, CNN (Sep. 29, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/politics/bernie-sanderschicago-koch-brothers-scotus/index.html; Andrew Prokop, President Obama: I’d Love a
Constitutional Amendment to Reverse Citizens United, VOX (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://www.vox.com/2015/2/9/7992489/obama-citizens-united-constitutional-amendment;
Bridget Bowman, Amy Klobuchar Launches 2020 Presidential Campaign, THE HILL (Feb.
10,
2019),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/amy-klobuchar-launches-2020presidential-campaign (“Klobuchar called for passing a constitutional amendment to
overturn the Supreme Court’s Citizens United campaign finance decision.”).
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lessons before embarking on yet another set of campaign finance
regulations. If reform advocates fail to learn from their past mistakes,
Chester Arthur’s ghost will continue to haunt the cause of campaign
finance reform for years to come.

